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I. Appellate Procedure in
the Ninth Circuit
A. En Banc Obstacles to Overruling Precedent
The doctrine of stare decisis gives needed stability to the law, but
at the same time stifles attempts to overrule precedents which are no
longer in harmony with present attitudes and circumstances. The
interaction of Rule 35 of the new Federal Rules of Appellate Pro-
cedure' and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' case of Upton v.
Commissioner2 has increased the burden of any litigant who seeks to
have a prior decision of the Ninth Circuit overruled. A dictum in
Upton? stated that a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit "could
not, except in en banc proceedings," overrule a prior decision of that
circuit.4  The statement has been repeated in several subsequent
decisions of the court, and evidently should be considered an un-
written rule of the Ninth Circuit.5
Rule 35 provides that a majority of the active circuit judges may
order a hearing or rehearing en banc of a case on appeal.6 A party
may suggest the appropriateness of an en banc hearing, but the sug-
gestion can only be acted upon if an active circuit judge or a judge of
the panel that first heard the case requests that the full court consider
it.7
This note will discuss briefly the history of en banc procedure in
the Ninth Circuit, the reasons for such a procedure, and the adherence
of the Ninth Circuit to Upton.
Background
The history of Rule 35 really begins in 1891. The Evarts Act8 of
that year established the Circuit Courts of Appeals as intermediate
1 FED. R. Asp. P. 35 (effective July 1, 1968).
2 283 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 911 (1961).
8 283 F.2d 723.
4 Id.
5 E.g., Carson v. United States, 310 F.2d 558, 561-62 (9th Cir. 1962);
Halprin v. United States, 295 F.2d 458, 461 (9th Cir. 1961); Ellis v. Carter, 291
F.2d 270, 273 n.3 (9th Cir. 1961).
6 FED. R. App. P. 35 (a).
7 Id. 35(b).
8 Evarts Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
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appellate courts to relieve the United States Supreme Court of much
of its appellate work. The Act provided that each circuit court of
appeals should "consist of three judges . . ... 9 The Judicial Code of
191110 continued the provision of three-judge panels,1 but at the
same time increased the number of circuit judgeships in several cir-
cuits to more than the original three.1 2 The ambiguity in the statute
did not become apparent until 1938.
By 1938 all but the First and Fourth Circuits had more than three
circuit judges. 13 None, except the District of Columbia Circuit, had
ever sat en banc.14  Instead, the practice of sitting in three-judge
panels had developed. Intra-circuit conflicts not resolved by the
circuit itself were dealt with in the same way as inter-circuit con-
flicts, by certification or writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.15
In 1938, the Ninth Circuit decided Lang's Estate v. Commis-
sioner.16 An earlier decision of the court, Bank of America v. Commis-
sioner,1'7 was cited to the court as precedent on a pivotal issue.'8 The
Lang panel disagreed with the two-to-one decision of the Bank of
America case, but was "faced with the situation where the decision of
two judges of the circuit made a precedent for the remaining five."'19
It dismissed the idea of an en banc hearing to resolve the conflict.
"Since no more than three judges may sit in the Circuit Court of
Appeals, there is no method of hearing or rehearing by a larger
number. '20  Rather than overrule Bank of America, the panel certi-
fied the substantive issue to the Supreme Court2' which resolved the
conflict but ignored the question of a circuit court of appeal's power
to sit en banc. 22
There matters rested until 1940. The Third Circuit, in deciding
9 Id. § 2.
10 Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1087.
11 Id. § 117.
12 Id. § 118.
18 Note, En Banc Hearings in the Federal Courts of Appeals: Accommo-
dating Institutional Responsibilities (Part I), 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 563, 570 & n.59
(1965).
14 See 55 HARV. L. REV. 663, 665, 666 n.16 (1942).
15 The Evarts Act of 1891, ch. 517, § 6, 26 Stat. 828, authorized certifi-
cation to the Supreme Court by the circuit courts of appeals of any question of
law upon which they desired instruction. E.g., Lang's Estate v. Commissioner,
97 F.2d 867 (9th Cir.), certified question answered, 304 U.S. 264 (1938).
16 97 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1938).
17 90 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1937).
18 97 F.2d at 869.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 869-70.
22 Lang's Estate v. Commissioner, 304 U.S. 264 (1938).
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the case of Commissioner v. Textile Mills Securities Corporation,3 was
in the same predicament as the Ninth Circuit in Lang. The court,
sitting en banc, rejected the Ninth Circuit's view of the en banc issue
and unanimously held that the circuit courts of appeals had the power
to sit en banc. 24 The court, splitting three-to-two on the substantive
issue, overruled a prior decision. On the en banc question the court
reasoned that the only logical construction of the Evarts Act, as
amended by the Judicial Code of 1911, was that the addition of more
judges to some circuits amended by implication the three-judge pro-
vision of the Act.25
The Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit holding on the
en banc issue.26 This decision was codified in 1948 in section 46 of
Title 28 of the United States Code.2 7  In Western Pacific Railroad
Corporation v. Western Pacific Railroad Company,28 decided in 1953,
the Supreme Court held that no litigant has a statutory right to
formal consideration of his application for rehearing en banc, 29 and
that the statute does not compel the adoption of a particular pro-
cedure by the circuits.30
The Court did formulate certain guidelines for the circuits: (1)
the circuits must make en banc procedure known to litigants; (2)
litigants should be able to suggest a hearing or rehearing en banc to
the court, although the suggestion is not to be treated like a motion
which would require formal action by the court; (3) the circuit courts
may initiate en banc hearings sua sponte; (4) the decision to sit en
banc might be made by the full court or delegated initially to the
panel, although the full court retained authority to revise the proce-
dure and withdraw the delegated power; (5) whether to rehear a case
in panel or en banc are two separate issues to be considered independ-
ently.31
In response to Western Pacific most circuits adopted formal rules
for en banc hearings. 32 The majority formulated procedures similar
23 117 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1940), affd, 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
24 Id. at 70, 71, 75.
25 Id. at 70.
28 Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
27 Judicial Code of 1948, ch. 646, § 46(c), 62 Stat. 871, as amended, 28
U.S.C. § 46(c) (1964).
28 345 U.S. 247 (1953).
29 Id. at 259.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 260-62.
32 For the most recent text of the individual circuit court rules in force
prior to the adoption of Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
see D.C. Cir. R. 26, 28 U.S.C.A. (1967 Supp.); 2d Cir. R. 25, 28 U.S.C.A. (1967
Supp.); 3d Cir. R. 4, 28 U.S.C.A. (1956); 5th Cir. R. 25(a), 29, 28 U.S.C.A. (1967
Supp.); 6th Cir. R. 3, 28 U.S.C.A. (1967 Supp.); 8th Cir. R. 15, 28 U.S.C.A. (1967
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to the present Rule 35.33 The Ninth Circuit, however, adopted more
restrictive rules which reflected its earlier apprehension over the
deleterious effects on its workload of allowing litigants even to sug-
gest en banc hearings.34 The original panel first had to grant a panel
rehearing. If a panel majority decided that en banc consideration of
the case was advisable, it so recommended to the full court. Then, a
majority of the active circuit judges had to vote for en banc hearing.35
Consequently, two judges on the panel, who might not even be active
circuit judges,3 6 could deny to the majority of the court the oppor-
tunity to consider the issue of sitting en banc.
This restrictive procedure was criticized as being contrary to the
"spirit and letter of the statute, [frustrating] the salutary purpose
of en banc procedure.137 A subsequent amendment to Rule 23, the
Ninth Circuit rule prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules, dropped
the requirement that the panel first must grant a panel rehearing be-
fore considering the en banc issue, but otherwise left effective control
in the panel.38 The adoption of a uniform en banc procedure by
Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure has liberalized
the practice and made it more consonant with the purpose of en banc
hearings.
The Utility of En Banc Hearings
The principal purpose of en bane power is the resolution of intra-
circuit conflict. 9 Although courts generally respect the principle of
stare decisis in the absence of special circumstances, successive panels
considering identical issues of law could each reach a different de-
cision, depending on panel composition. Since the decision of a panel
is the decision of the whole court of appeals,40 a subsequent decision
Supp.); 9th Cir. R. 23, 28 U.S.C.A. (1967 Supp.); 10th Cir. R. 20 (7), 28 U.S.C.A.
(1956).
33 See, e.g., 2d Cir. R. 25(b), 28 U.S.C.A. (1967 Supp.); 3d Cir. R. 4(3), 28
U.S.C.A. (1956); 5th Cir. R. 25(a), 28 U.S.C.A. (1967 Supp.); 6th Cir. R. 3,
28 U.S.C.A. (1967 Supp.).
34 See Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 197 F.2d 994,
1014-15 (9th Cir. 1951), rehearing en banc denied, 197 F.2d 1016 (1952), rev'd
and remanded, 345 U.S. 247 (1953).
35 9th Cir. R. 23, 28 U.S.C.A. (1967 Supp.), superseded by FED. R. App. P.
35 (1968).
36 Both District Judges and Senior Circuit Judges often sit by designa-
tion on circuit courts of appeals' panels.
37 Note, En Banc Proceedings in the United States Court of Appeals, 22
Gso. WAsH. L. Rsv. 482, 491 (1954) (emphasis by author).
38 9th Cir. R. 23, 28 U.S.C.A. (1967 Supp.), amending 9th Cir. R. 23, 28
U.S.C.A. (1956).
39 Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 268,
270-71 (1953) (concurring opinion).
40 28 U.S.C.A. § 46(c) Reviser's Note (1968).
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necessarily will overrule by implication, if not expressly, a prior con-
flicting one.41 This would jeopardize the stability of the law and the
prestige of the court and would be highly unfair to litigants. The pub-
lic should be able to rely on past decisions as settled law and should
not be subject to the vagaries of panel composition. There must be
some way of maintaining uniformity and, more important, continuity
within the circuit.
The circuit courts of appeals are each responsible for the main-
tenance of this uniformity. The Supreme Court ended the practice
of resolving intra-circuit conflict by certiorari to the Supreme Court
in 1957. The Court, in Wisniewski v. United States,42 pointed out
that the circuits had the power and the procedure to fulfill their
responsibilities of maintaining intra-circuit uniformity.43  En banc
procedure is most appropriate because the active circuit judges
are the fulltime, permanent judges who make up the circuit court
of appeals. They should be the ones who make the final decision on
circuit policy on any issue. To have held otherwise would have under-
mined the authority of the circuit courts of appeals as the courts of
last resort in most federal cases.
A discussion of the impact of en banc hearings on court workloads
and of the problems inherent in such procedure is outside the scope of
this note.44 Suffice it to say that en banc consideration of cases re-
quires much more time than do panel hearings. Extensive use of en
banc hearings would seriously interfere with the expeditious disposi-
tion of cases.45 With this in mind, the relative infrequency of en banc
hearings is understandable. 4
Ironically, despite the Ninth Circuit's conservative outlook on en
banc hearings, since 1940 it has decided more cases en banc than all
but two circuits, the District of Columbia Circuit and the Third Cir-
cuit, and one-seventh of the total in all circuits. 47  This is but a
fraction of the total cases decided by the Ninth Circuit. Nevertheless,
any substantial increase over this small amount could overload the
court's capacity, already strained to the limit. One factor that cer-
41 See Baez-Geigel v. American Foreign S.S. Corp., 171 F. Supp. 359,
361 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
42 353 U.S. 901 (1957) (per curiam).
43 Id. at 902; accord, In re Burwell, 350 U.S. 521 (1956).
44 For an excellent and comprehensive treatment of en banc procedure
see Note, En Banc Hearings in the Federal Courts of Appeals: Accommodating
Institutional Responsibilities (Part I & II), N.Y.U.L. Ray. 563, 726 (1965).
45 For a discussion of the effects of en banc hearings on court case
loads see id. at 574-75.
48 From 1940 until 1964, the circuit courts of appeals decided 422 cases
en banc. Id. at 746 Appendix V.
47 Id. at 749.
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tainly accounts for the large number of en banc decisions by the
Ninth Circuit is the fact that it is one of the busiest circuits. Another
could be the Upton dictum,48 which implies that the rule of overruling
cases only en banc had existed long before its expression in that case.
Avoiding Upton
Decisions like Heisler v. United States, 49 a recently decided Ninth
Circuit case, tend to indicate that Upton is not always adhered to, but
sometimes is avoided by distinguishing cases. Heisler had been
charged with uttering counterfeit money. The indictment charged
passing a $20.00 Federal Reserve Note, when in fact it was a $10.00
Note. When the error was discovered during trial, the government
moved to amend the indictment on the ground of clerical error. The
court overruled the defendant's objections, but deferred action on the
motion until after trial. The indictment itself was not physically
altered, but at the time of conviction the motion was granted.50
Heisler appealed to the Ninth Circuit. He claimed that there was
a fatal variance between the proof and the indictment and also that
the order amending the indictment voided the indictment.51 The
Ninth Circuit held that the variance was harmless error, 2 a position
strongly supported by case law.53 The court had more difficulty with
the amended indictment. Its decision in Carney v. United States,5 4 11
years before, held that amending an indictment, which charged coun-
terfeiting "K-14" ration coupons, to read "A-14" coupons, rendered the
indictment a nullity.55 Carney's conviction was reversed 5 on the
authority of Ex parte Bain,57 an early Supreme Court case. Bain
held that any change in the indictment was fatal to a verdict brought
in under that indictment.58
The Heisler court admitted 59 that it was hard to reconcile Carney
and other similar cases 0 with cases holding that an amendment would
48 283 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1960). See text accompanying note 2 supra.
49 394 F.2d 692 (9th Cir .1968).
50 Id. at 693-94.
51 Id. at 694.
52 Id.
53 See cases cited id.
54 163 F.2d 784 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 824 (1947).
55 163 F.2d at 788.
56 Id. at 788-89.
57 121 U.S. 1 (1887).
58 Id. at 13.
50 394 F.2d at 695.
60 E.g., Edgerton v. United States, 143 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1944). In this
case the Ninth Circuit held that although a court might treat words in an
indictment as surplusage, it could not strike words from the indictment
even if it did not physically alter the paper. Id. at 699.
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be proper if it were a matter of form and not of substance,6' or that
it is proper to strike surplusage, but not by amending the indictment.
62
The Heisler court said, "[s]urely, in this enlightened age, it makes
little sense to hold that a court may 'strike' language from an indict-
ment, and tell the jury to disregard it, but may not actually amend
the fact of the indictment to conform to its order."63 It felt that the
"progeny" of Bain were "out of joint," but refused, nevertheless, to
overrule them.64
The court distinguished the factual situation in Carney, rather
than overrule Carney. It distinguished the case on the basis that
Heisler was tried to a court, the amendment came after trial, no
physical change was made on the paper, and the order to amend was
simultaneous with the adjudication of guilt.6 5 The order to amend
was treated as a nullity and, therefore, the indictment stood as found
and presented.6 6 Because the face amount of the note was not an
essential element of the offense, the conviction was valid.67 Even
though the Ninth Circuit gave valid reasons for distinguishing Car-
ney, it was very obviously struggling to avoid overruling it. This
manner of distinguishing cases is not new to the law, but it certainly
calls into question the force of Upton.
Conclusion
In cases like Heisler, where the precedent is over 20 years old,
the reasons for overruling en banc are not as strong as they are
when the court has to deal with a more recent decision. This is
particularly true when the legal climate surrounding, and the judicial
attitude toward, the point at issue had changed markedly during that
time. Distinguishing cases solely to avoid overruling them leads to
patchwork results over the long run. A more forthright approach is
desirable. In the light of judicial aversion to overruling precedent,
the Upton dictum seems an unncessary additional extension of stare
decisis.
Upton has the added drawback of limiting the court's flexibility.
61 394 F.2d at 695 & n.2, citing Williams v. United States, 179 F.2d 656,
659-60 (5th Cir. 1950).
62 394 F.2d at 696 & n.7, citing Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593,
602 (1927) and United States v. Krepper, 159 F.2d 958, 969-71 (3d Cir. 1946),
cert. denied, 330 U.S. 824 (1947).
63 Heisler v. United States, 394 F.2d 692, 696 (9th Cir. 1968).
64 Id.
65 Id. Carney was tried to a jury, the amendment came during trial,
and the indictment was physically altered. Carney v. United States, 163 F.2d
784, 788 (9th Cir. 1947).
66 Heisler v. United States, 394 F.2d 692, 696 (9th Cir. 1968).
67 Id.
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In many cases where the Ninth Circuit is confronted with an out-
moded decision, panel overruling would be entirely appropriate and
would save time by decreasing the necessity of convening the court
en banc. Only when the panel feels that it would be necessary or
proper for the full court to formulate a new rule or when conflicts
between views of two more or less contemporary panels arise, should
the case be considered en banc. Under Rule 35, any active circuit
judge who feels strongly about a particular case can suggest en banc
consideration as well.68 The result would be a possible diminution in
the number of en banc hearings and, at the same time, a more rational
development of the case law.
C.A.S.
68 FED. R. APP. P. 35 (b).
II. Bankruptcy
A. Application of Res Judicata to Denial of Discharge-
Turner v. Boston, 393 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1968).
A discharge in bankruptcy will be denied for any of the seven
reasons listed in section 32(c) of the Bankruptcy Act.' Turner v.
Boston2 arose from a violation of the fifth clause of the section, the
only clause which is not directed at reprehensible conduct.3 It has
long been held that denial of a discharge, for any reason, is res judicata
as to the debts scheduled in that petition.4 However, Judge Browning,
speaking for the Ninth Circuit, held that res judicata should not be
applied where a discharge was denied for the sole reason that the
debtor innocently miscalculated and failed to wait a full six years
from the date of his prior discharge before applying for a second one.
In so doing, the court reversed the district court decision, reversed
its own position taken some 34 years before,5 and renewed the con-
flict between the circuits.
In 1958, Turner voluntarily petitioned for a declaration of bank-
ruptcy and a discharge from his debts. He was declared a bankrupt
and the discharge was granted. Over the next five years Turner's busi-
ness ran at a loss, and his debts again mounted. In 1963, he filed a
second bankruptcy petition. By miscalculation, Turner filed one-
hundred days before the required six-year period following his prior
discharge had elapsed. This violation of section 32 (c) (5), the six-year
rule, resulted in denial of a discharge. In 1966, Turner filed a third
petition and listed among his creditors those whom he had listed in the
second proceeding. One creditor objected to a discharge and sought
to apply the rule of res judicata to debts which had been scheduled
on the second petition. If the court applied res judicata, Turner would
1 11 U.S.C. § 32(c) (1964). Section 32(c) provides in pertinent part:
"The court shall grant the discharge unless satisfied that the bankrupt has
... in a proceeding under this title commenced within six years prior to the
date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy ... been granted a dis-
charge ......
2 393 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1968).
3 See Prudential Loan & Fin. Co. v. Robarts, 52 F.2d 918, 919 (5th Cir.
1931).
4 Freshman v. Atkins, 269 U.S. 121, 123 (1925); Harris v. Warshawsky,
184 F.2d 660, 661 (2d Cir. 1950) ; see Bluthenthal v. Jones, 208 U.S. 64, 66 (1908).
5 McCausland v. International Shoe Co., 79 F.2d 1001 (9th Cir. 1935),
dismissing appeal from In re McCausland, 9 F. Supp. 129 (S.D. Cal. 1934).
[919]
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never be able to discharge those debts scheduled on the second
petition. His innocent violation of the six-year rule would be a very
expensive mistake.
Weight of Authority
Turner's dilemma is not unique. Other debtors have made the
same error with mixed results. 6 Two separate and conflicting lines
of authority have emerged 7 even though only three previous cases
have reached a court of appeals.8 Prudential Loan & Finance Com-
pany v. Robarts9 was the first of these cases. In Robarts, the Fifth
Circuit held that res judicata should not be applied where the second
discharge had been refused because of a prior discharge within six
years. The court stated that the six-year rule "stands on a different
footing from a refusal on any other ground set forth in [section 32
(c) ] "10 and that the rule "was not intended to result in making the
provable claims of creditors bankruptcy proof forever.""
In re McCausland,2 which followed Robarts by three years, pre-
sented to the Ninth Circuit a preview of Turner. The court dismissed
McCausland's appeal, 3 thereby adopting the district court's holding
that res judicata barred a discharge of debts scheduled in the previous
petition. Robarts was not followed-conflict had emerged.
In 1942, the Second Circuit also chose not to follow Robarts. In
Chopnick v. Tokatyan14 it held that a "[d] enial of a discharge from
provable debts.., bars an application in the subsequent proceeding
for a discharge from the same debts.... We think this equally true
whether denial was because of a previous discharge within six years
or on some other ground specified in section [32 (c) ] ."15
6 See Chopnick v. Tokatyan, 128 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied,
317 U.S. 667 (1942); Prudential Loan & Fin. Co. v. Robarts, 52 F.2d 918 (5th
Cir. 1931); In re Masterson, 240 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Cal. 1963); In re Finkelstein,
62 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D.N.Y. 1945); In re Newman, 48 Am. Bankr. R. (n.s.) 781
(N.D. Ohio 1942); In re McCausland, 9 F. Supp. 129 (S.D. Cal. 1934), appeal
dismissed sub nom., McCausland v. International Shoe Co., 79 F.2d 1001 (9th
Cir. 1935); In re Gilson, 12 Am. Bankr. R. (n.s.) 325 (M.D. Tenn. 1928).
7 See In re Masterson, 240 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Cal. 1963); Annot., 156
A.L.R. 850-851 (1945).
8 Chopnick v. Tokatyan, 128 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1942); McCausland v.
International Shoe Co., 79 F.2d 1001 (9th Cir. 1935); Prudential Loan & Fin.
Co. v. Robarts, 52 F.2d 918 (5th Cir. 1931).
9 52 F.2d 918 (1931).
10 Id. at 919.
11 Id.
12 9 F. Supp. 129 (S.D. Cal. 1934), appeal dismissed sub nom., McCaus-
land v. International Shoe Co., 79 F.2d 1001 (9th Cir. 1935).
13 McCausland v. International Shoe Co., 79 F.2d 1001 (9th Cir. 1935).
14 128 F.2d 521 (1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 667 (1942).
15 128 F.2d at 522.
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Neither Chopnick nor Robarts stand alone. The position taken
by each case has its adherents. 16 However, the only decision in the 20
years preceding Turner,7 and all the commentators, 8 have recog-
nized that Robarts represents the better view.
Origin of the Conflict
Section 32(c) provided reasons for denying a discharge, but denial
of a previous discharge was not one of them.' 9 Less than five years
after passage of the Act, however, the Second Circuit concluded that
where a discharge had been denied because of fraud on the part of the
debtor, the denial should be permanent. 20 The court applied res
judicata to "protect the creditors from an attempt to retry an issue
already tried and determined between the same parties [and deter-
mined that] the court, for its own protection, should arrest, in limine,
so flagrant an attempt to circumvent its decrees."' 21 It reasoned that
unless there was some deterrent, there would be little to prevent a
dishonest debtor from concealing assets and attempting to obtain a
discharge knowing that if he failed he could try again. If a second
petiton failed, nothing stood in the way of a third. The creditors
would have to be vigilant to protect their rights and the judicial proc-
ess would be abused. The application of res judicata supplied the
necessary deterrrent to eliminate this burden on both creditors and
16 Adherents of the Robarts position include: In re Materson, 240 F.
Supp. 543 (N.D. Cal. 1963); In re Newman, 48 Am. Bankr. R. (n.s.) 781 (N.D.
Ohio 1942); cf. Holmes v. Davidson, 84 F.2d 111 (9th Cir. 1936); In re
Simmerly, 38 Am. Bankr. R. (n.s.) 425 (N.D. Ohio 1938); In re Dierck, 37 Am.
Bankr. R. (n.s.) 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1938); In re Perry, 50 F.2d 464 (N.D. Ga. 1931).
Adherents of the Chopnick position include: In re Finkelstein, 62 F. Supp. 1015
(E.D.N.Y. 1945); In re McCausland, 9 F. Supp. 129 (S.D. Cal. 1934); In re Gil-
son, 12 Am. Bankr. R. (n.s.) 325 (M.D. Tenn. 1928).
17 In re Masterson, 240 F Supp. 543 (N.D. Cal. 1963).
18 1 COLLiER ON BANKRUPTCY 11 14.53, at 1423 (14th ed. 1968); Moore, Res
Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in Bankruptcy, 68 YALE L.J. 1, 17 (1958);
Oglebay, Some Developments in Bankruptcy Law, 18 REP. J. 9, 10 (1943); see
59 HARv. L. REV. 461, 461-62 (1946). See generally 45 HARv. L. REv. 1110 (1932).
19 The reasons for denying a discharge are: (1) commission of an of-
fense punishable by imprisonment as provided under 18 U.S.C. § 152; (2)
destruction, falsification or concealment of financial records; (3) obtaining
money on credit by publishing false statements respecting financial condition;
(4) transferring, destroying, or concealing property during the twelve months
preceding the filing of the bankruptcy petition with the intention of defrauding
creditors; (5) having been granted a discharge in a proceeding commenced
within six years; (6) refusing to obey any lawful order of, or to answer any
material question approved by the court; and (7) failing to explain satis-
factorily any losses of assets or deficiencies of assets to meet liabilities.
20 In re Fiegenbaum, 121 F. 69 (2d Cir. 1903).
21 Id. at 70.
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courts.
22
Courts, however, have not limited the application of res judicata
to cases in which an unscrupulous debtor sought a discharge for a
second time. It soon became the rule that "the denial of a discharge,
for whatever reason, becomes res judicata, not to be questioned in a
later bankruptcy."23 Under this rule there is no room to examine the
record to determine why the earlier discharge was denied. This rule
ignores the distinction between the unscrupulous debtor and the
debtor who innocently violates the six-year rule by filing too soon.
Herein lies the conflict. This punishment of the innocent along with
the guilty does not seem to fit the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act, one
of which is to "'relieve the honest debtor from the weight of
oppressive indebtedness, and permit him to start afresh free from
obligations and responsibilities consequent upon his business mis-
fortunes.' "24 The fact that a bankruptcy court is a court of equity2
seems to be overlooked. The ideas that a discharge should not be
denied for mere technical reasons2 or without examining the debtor's
intent27 are not considered. Also overlooked is the almost universally
stated principle that the Bankruptcy Act should be construed liberally
in favor of the debtor.
28
The Turner Holding
The court in Turner adopted the view that the automatic appli-
cation of res judicata to bar a discharge, after it had once been denied
for violating the six-year rule, would be inequitable. It found that an
interpretation of the rule which required such action would severely
punish an innocent debtor.29 Judge Browning did not find persuasive
either of the reasons urged for barring Turner's discharge. The doc-
trine of res judicata, the first reason proposed, was held to be a cre-
ation of the courts3 0 which the Ninth Circuit had chosen not to apply
once before.8 1 After determining that Congress did not intend a
22 Id. at 70-71.
23 Harris v. Warshawsky, 184 F.2d 660, 661 (2d Cir. 1950) (emphasis
added); see In re Dunn, 251 F. Supp. 637, 640 (M.D. Ga. 1966) (cases cited
therein).
24 Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1933) (emphasis added),
quoting Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 236 U.S. 549,
554-55 (1915).
25 Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240 (1933).
26 See Dilworth v. Boothe, 69 F.2d 621, 624 (5th Cir. 1934).
27 See In re Pioch, 235 F.2d 903, 905-06 (3d Cir. 1956).
28 E.g., Spach v. Strauss, 373 F.2d 641, 642-43 (5th Cir. 1967); Gross v.
"A idelity & Deposit Co., 302 F.2d 338, 340 (8th Cir. 1962).
29 Turner v. Boston, 393 F.2d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 1968).
30 Id. at 686.
31 Holmes v. Davidson, 84 F.2d 111, 113 (9th Cir. 1936).
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denial of a discharge to last forever,32 the court decided not to apply
the doctrine because its application would contravene this congres-
sional intention.3"
The second reason arose from the fear that unless early filing drew
a severe penalty a debtor would abuse the Bankruptcy Act by filing
prematurely to obtain temporary relief from pressing creditors. This
fear was found unsupportable. 34 The court found that nothing would
prevent a bankruptcy court from acting promptly upon a claim of
premature filing, and a creditor met with a stay could move to va-
cate it "whenever the debtor has been granted a discharge within the
six-year period."3 5 Consequently, the temporary relief afforded the
debtor by filing early would be so brief that it would provide little
incentive for taking the action.
Conclusion
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Turner is significant because it
adds considerable weight to the line of cases which rejects the auto-
matic application of res judicata to bar forever the discharge of debts
where a prior discharge had been denied for violating the six-year
rule.30 It is unlikely that a similar case will reach a court of appeal.
Turner, it is submitted, should end the controversy. The Ninth Cir-
cuit has adopted the better view. It recognizes that "[t]he policy
of the law favors discharges in bankruptcy [and] '[u]nless it
clearly appears that the bankrupt has committed some act which
precludes his right, he is entitled to a discharge.' ,,37 The act of filing
for a discharge before the six-year period following a prior discharge
has elapsed, if innocent, is not such an act.
LS.B.
32 Turner v. Boston, 393 F.2d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 1968).
33 Id.
34 Id. at 687.
5 Id.
86 For cases adopting the Robarts view see note 16 supra.
U7 E.g., In re Chaval, 386 F.2d 127, 129 (3d Cir. 1967).
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